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1. Introduction  
Efficient market theory assumes market 
participants act rationally and react quickly to new 
information. But the theory holds when 
information is widely available to market 
participants at the same time (Shleifer, 2000). In 
such condition stock prices should reflect the 
economic reality of a company. However, firms 
may intentionally hide bad news to avoid its 
negative effect on stock prices. In such a situation, 
the firm’s stock price will no longer reflect real 
financial conditions. When the market finally 
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discover the accumulated bad news and react 
accordingly, large drop in stock prices will occur 
(Habib et al., 2017). A sharp decline of stock 
prices in short period is widely known as stock 
price crashes. The incidence of stock price crashes 
has drawn many empirical studies in various 
capital markets that seek to identify the 
determinants of stock price crashes (Chang et al., 
2017; Harymawan et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019; 
Shleifer, 2000).  
The concept of bad news hoarding has been 
the widely accepted argument to explain stock 
price crashes (Chen et al., 2017; Habib et al., 2017; 
Hutton et al., 2009). It is based on the assumption 
that managers have incentives to withold or keep 
bad news from market knowledge for an extended 
period. Systematic efforts to influence earnings 
will result in overvaluation of the firm’s stock 
price. Prior studies confirm the tendency of 
managers to hide and suspend the disclosure of 
bad news to avoid its negative effect on manager 
long term career and compensation (Chang et al., 
2017; Jung et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2011; Kothari 
et al., 2009). Meanwhile, Liu, Ng, Tang, & Zhong 
(2019) demonstrated that the credit swap market 
allows market participants to reduce the likelihood 
of bad news hoarding and thus lowers the risk of 
stock price crashes. Guan, Kim, Bon, Xin, & Liu 
(2019) reported that transparency in the bond 
market reduces the risk of stock price crashes.    
Systematic efforts to delay the disclosure of 
bad news hinder the flow of negative information 
into capital market, causing the distribution of 
stock returns to be unsymmetrical (Hutton et al., 
2009; Kothari et al., 2009). Default risk is one 
example of bad news that managers try to withold 
from public disclosure. However, the ability of 
managers to hide default risk are not limitless. 
Once the accumulation of bad news passes a 
certain threshold, all bad news must be revealed at 
once. Severe financial difficulties that a firm faces 
must be released immediately, triggering a 
negative response from investors. As a result, 
firm’s stock price drop significantly. A sharp 
decline in stock prices within a relatively short 
period of time is widely called stock price crashes 
(Habib et al., 2017; Hutton et al., 2009). 
Deliberate concealment of firm’s economic 
realities can be accomplished through income 
smoothing (Chen et al., 2017; Kothari et al., 2009). 
Income smoothing practices produce stable and 
persistent earnings, making investors believe on 
firm’s prospects. A survey conducted by Graham 
et al., (2005) shows that almost 97% of 400 top 
executives prefer more stable earnings to maintain 
positive perceptions of investors. Smooth earnings 
is a signal that helps investors estimate firm's real 
prospects more accurately. In this regard, income 
smoothing is a mechanism to communicate private 
information to prevent the downside risk of equity 
values (Badertscher et al., 2012). If investors can 
interpret the signal, the resulting effect on stock 
price will be positive and the likelihood of stock 
price crashes decreases.  
However, Healy's (1985) classic study and 
several studies thereafter (for example, Fudenberg 
& Tirole, 1995; Defond & Park, 1997) show that 
managers smooth earnings to meet bonus targets 
and secure jobs. Such motives have the potential 
to reduce firm’s value. Using US firms, Chen et 
al., (2017) provide evidence of positive 
relationship between income smoothing and stock 
price crashes, suggesting that income smoothing 
causes a negative impact on firm’s value.  
The findings also indicate that the US capital 
market is an efficient capital market. US Market 
participants seem to be knowledgeable in 
analyzing firm's financial statements that income 
smoothing cannot be used to obscure firm’s real 
condition. It is unlikely to expect that Indonesian 
investors will have similar response to the practice 
of income smoothing.  
This study aims to examine the moderating 
effect of manager age, income smoothing, and 
default risk on stock price crashes. Positive 
correlation between income smoothing and stock 
price crashes reported in Chen et al., (2017) 
indicates that US investors were able to see 
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beyond earning numbers and not affected by the 
company's efforts to display smooth earnings to 
hide poor performance. This is not necessarily true 
with indonesian investors. Indonesia capital 
market may not as efficient as US capital market. 
Thus, the effect of income smoothing on stock 
price crashes remain an empirical question in the 
context of Indonesian capital market. Paralel test 
is also conducted on default risk. None of the prior 
studies tested the moderating effect of manager 
age.  
A test of age moderating effects is motivated 
by Andreou et al., (2017) in which they show that 
firms with younger managers (CEOs) were more 
likely to experience stock price crashes. They 
argue that younger managers have greater 
incentives to show their capabilities in managing 
firms to gain early rises in compensation. Younger 
managers are more sensitive about firm 
performance because labor market will use their 
past performance in determining the level of 
compensation. Bad performance are more costly 
for younger managers than the older ones, causing 
younger managers have more incentive to 
withhold negative performance. In this 
perspective, the effect of income smoothing and 
default risk on stock price crashes may be 
influenced by the age of managers who run the 
company. In addition, this study also includes 
several control variables that have been reported 
previously to affect stock price crashes. 
Specifically, the control variables are firm size, 
profitability, debt levels (leverage) and sales 
growth (Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2009; Jin 
& Myers, 2006). 
The following section discusses the 
theoretical framework and the formulation of the 
hypothesis. Research method section provides 
information about how the study conducted 
including the samples and data analysis method. 
Following that, the results and discussion section 
interprets the findings and discusses them with 
prior research. Finally, the conclusion section 
summarizes and concludes the research findings 
and provides suggestions for further research.         
 
2. Literature review 
Agency theory suggests that information 
asymmetry between managers and stockholders 
will lead to agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Managers are more prone to opportunistic 
behaviour when control mechanisms do not 
function effectively. Having informational 
advantage over stockholders allow them to exploit 
information for personal gain and engage in short-
sighted personal target at the expense of long run 
stockholders well-being (Andreou et al., 2017). 
Opportunistic behaviour may take two forms:  
undertaking inefficient investment decisions that 
aims at higher stock price, or engaging in earnings 
management to maintain inflated stock price. One 
way to accomplish earnings management is 
through adopting income-increasing accounting 
policies. At least, managers can choose accounting 
policies to obscure firm’s economic reality so that 
firm’s price remain unchanged. Systematic effort 
to avoid stock price decline may last for an 
extended period as long as the opportunity 
remains.    
Most research on stock price crashes have 
been built upon bad news hoardings argument 
proposed by (Jin & Myers, 2006). Conceptually, 
stock price crash risk  stems from the inability of 
managers to withhold accumulated bad news after 
having passed a certain threshold (Habib et al., 
2017). Managers have attempted to withhold bad 
news from market knowledge for an extended 
period. But it is not limitless. Ultimately, 
accumulated bad news must be revealed at once. 
When the market learn how bad the condition of 
the firm really is, they will simultaneously release 
the firm’s shares, leading to stock price crashes 
(Hutton et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). When 
bad news accumulation is no longer able to be 
hidden from the market, distribution of stock 
returns becomes asymmetric and negatively biased 
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(Hutton et al., 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006; Zhu, 
2016). 
Estimation errors resulting from efforts to 
report smooth earnings are widely known as 
income smoothing. As a special type of earnings 
management, income smoothing is carried out 
through manipulation of accrual accounting as 
well (Tessema & Deumes, 2017). In addition to 
accelerating or shifting the recognition of costs, 
income smoothing can also be accomplished 
through allowance for uncollectible debts. The 
uncertainty of cash receipts from credit sales 
requires managers to set aside a portion of credit 
sales as uncollectible receivables (Subramanyam, 
2014). However, the estimated amount of 
uncollectible receivables are subject to error due 
to unintentional-human errors or deliberate errors 
to increase or decrease earnings. In addition to 
adjusting accrual items, income smoothing can 
also be done through real activities such as 
offering price discounts at the end of the year, 
changing the delivery schedule, and delaying or 
speeding up intangible asset maintenance.   
 
Income smoothing and stock price crashes  
The current accounting standards open rooms 
for managers to to engage in income smoothing 
(Yao, 2014). Although discussions on income 
smoothing have been more on theoretical 
perspectives, recent firms’ financial reporting 
suggest that the practice of income smoothing is 
not merely conceptual discourse but is actually 
carried out by firms. Gu & Zhao (2016) and Chen 
et al., (2017) state that managers have extensively 
engaged in income smoothing as reflected in 
Graham et al., (2005) findings. Acharya & 
Lambrecht (2015) claim that the practice of 
income smoothing has a long tradition in financial 
reporting. One example is Telecommunications 
company (ITT) led by Harold Geneen from 1959 
to 1977. During the period, ITT recorded increases 
in earnings for fifty-eight consecutive quarters. 
Many believe that the increase is a result of income 
smoothing aiming to provide stable earnings 
growth throughout his leadership. Other firms that 
are also believed to practice income smoothing are 
Microsoft, General Electric, and American 
Express.     
 Income smoothing has the potential to reduce 
firm value. According to Acharya & Lambrecht 
(2015) pressure to meet market’s earnings 
expectations motivate managers to engage in 
income smoothing. They argue that shuffling cash 
flows backward and forward to smooth earnings 
may bring unintended consequences on firm value. 
The risk of meeting market’s earnings expectation 
may force managers to take a shortcut by cutting 
investment expenses, causing firm value 
decreases. In an attemp to smooth earnings, 
managers distort real decisions and destroy firm 
value in the long run.   
In contrast to the perspective that income 
smoothing may cause damage to firm value, some 
argue that income smoothing can be justified as a 
signaling tool, conveying private information to 
shareholders about the firm's prospects. Sankar & 
Subramanyam (2001) seek to understand the 
behaviour of managers towards reporting earnings 
using the economic exchange model in two 
periods. In this model, managers are assumed to 
report biased earnings in the current period and the 
bias reverse in the future. If the reversal exceeds 
the minimum limit, managers will be encouraged 
to level out earnings. Income smoothing is carried 
out with the aim of communicating private 
information through reported earnings. Results of 
their analytical study proof that income smoothing 
aiming to meet market expectations result in value 
creation for company. 
Another analytical study conducted by 
Kirschenheither & Melumad (2002) also supports 
income smoothing as a means of communicating 
private information. They developed a financial 
reporting model in which investors seek to assess 
the precision of earnings reported by companies. It 
assumes that earnings shock reduce the ability of 
investors to assess the quality earnings and thus 
decreases firm value. To prevent a decline in firm 
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value, managers engage in income smoothing. 
Their analysis showed that income smoothing 
through ‘big bath’ in the current period produce 
higher future profits and increase the value of the 
firm.  
The preceding arguments highlight two 
conflicting arguments that can be used to explain 
the impact of income smoothing on firm value. 
One argument emphasizes the opportunistic nature 
of managers who intentionally obscure real 
financial performance to avoid the market’s 
negative perception. Unstable reported earnings is 
a signal that firms are experiencing difficulties in 
maintaining earnings growth. Accordingly, 
systematic efforts are required to prevent negative 
perception that might harm firm market value 
(Kirschenheither & Melumad, 2002). Managers 
are at risk of losing their jobs following the decline 
in firm value (Defond & Park, 1997). Therefore, it 
is important for managers to report earnings that 
meets market earnings expectations (Acharya & 
Lambrecht, 2015). One way to avoid the negative 
effects of bad news is to temporarily hold the 
publication of bad news from market knowledge.  
The second argument for income smoothing is 
the desire to convey private information. As an 
insider, managers have unlimited access to 
information that enable them to predict firm’s 
future performance. Ease of access into private 
information makes them superior over outside 
parties in understanding the true condition of the 
firm. If managers strongly believe that firms have 
good prospect but investors do not share the same 
conviction, they have to find ways to reduce the 
information asymmetry. Directly inform the 
market that firm is in a good condition may not be 
a good choice. Firms choose to smooth earnings as 
indirect way to convey firm’s real condition. If the 
signal successfully changes the market's 
perception, then market value increases and stock 
price crashes can be suppressed. This argument is 
consistent with Shabani & Sofian (2018) who find 
a negative relationship between income smoothing 
and bankruptcy risk.  
Since arguments for and against income 
smoothing are equally reasonable, following 
hypothesis is stated with no specific direction.      
H1: Income smoothing is associated with stock 
price crashes.  
 
Default risk and stock price crashes 
Among other factors, rational investors base 
their stock investment decisions on the ability of 
firms to meet their obligations. A failure to meet 
financial obligations will affect  firm’s future 
operation and flexibility to respond market 
dynamics. Thus, default risks determine investors 
expected return (Garlappi et al., 2008). Higher 
default risk lead to higher demand of returns 
(Chava & Purnanandam, 2010). The likelihood of 
financial failure is reflected in higher debt ratio. 
Higher debt ratios suggest that firms are very 
dependent on debt to finance existing investment 
projects, causing default risk increases 
(Subramanyam, 2014). 
He & Ren (2017) define default risk as the 
probability of firms failing to meet financial 
obligations. Similarly, Garlappi et al., (2008) 
defines defaul risk as the probability of failure to 
pay principal and related interest. Conceptually, 
default risk is different from financial constraints 
(He & Ren, 2017). A company is considered to be 
financially constraints if it has difficulty getting 
external sources to finance its operation. Firms 
having financial constraints are more likely to 
experience higher default risk compared to other 
companies. However, a threat of default risks can 
be reduced by increasing future cash flow through 
profitable investment projects (He & Ren, 2017).  
Financially constraints firms are less likely to 
invest in such projects due to insufficient source of 
funds.  
Acharya & Lambrecht (2015) conducted an 
empirical analysis to determine the most 
appropriate financial policies that firms can adopt 
in limited external funding situation. In such 
conditions, firms must formulate policies to 
maintain availability of funds. There are two 
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choices that can be made: increasing cash balances 
by making savings and issuing additional debt or 
increasing firm's ability to attract creditors. The 
analysis shows the tendency of firms to increase 
cash or reduce the level of debt in the context of 
future investment financing depends on the 
sensitivity of cash flow to various investment 
opportunities. In other words, firms having 
financial difficulties adjust funding options to 
maintain cash flow stability. If funding choices are 
limited, then it is very likely that firms overlook 
profitable investment projects (He & Ren, 2017). 
The situation is expected to exacerbate financial 
problems and default risks, leading to stock price 
crashes.  
Preceding analysis suggests that firms with 
financial constraints have difficulties in obtaining 
external financing. Potential default increases the 
likelihood of stock price crashes. Realizing the 
negative consequence of default risks, managers 
attempt to hide bad news to avoid stock price 
decline and maintain current stock price. As a 
result, current stock prices fail to reflect the firm’s 
intrinsic value. Once accumulation of bad news 
are revealed to the market, investors would react 
negatively and stock price drop significantly 
(Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011).  
He & Ren (2017) suggest an alternative 
argument which is contrary to the previous 
explanation. They argue that the incidence of stock 
price crashes can only occur when investors are 
unable to detect financial constraints and their 
impact on stock prices. If the markets are assumed 
to be able to detect financial distress early and find 
out deliberate attempt to hide bad news, investors 
will gradually adjust the firm’stock price. Slower 
decline in stock prices deters the possibility of 
stock price crashes.  
Nonetheless, prior studies examining the 
impact of financial difficulties on stock returns 
unveiled that the market is unable to detect and 
assess the impact of financial constraints on firm 
value (Lamon et al., 2001; White & Wu, 2006). 
Investors require private information to discover 
amount of hidden bad news and make necessary 
adjustments to firm’s stock price. Access to 
private information is possible only if investor 
have informants in the company. 
Given the two opposing views described 
above, the relationship between default risk and 
stock price crashes cannot be determined 
convincingly.  
H2: Default risks are associated with stock  price 
crashes   
 
Age of manager and stock price crashes 
Performance-based compensation is a 
common practice in the business world. Labor 
market tracks workers achievements and use them 
as a basis to determine wages to be received in 
future employment. Outstanding performance 
increases a manager’s value in the labor market 
and result in higher future compensation (Andreou 
et al., 2017). Therefore, past managerial 
achievements is closely related to future 
compensation.   
The desire to make superior achievements is 
stronger for younger managers because they need 
to impress labor market about their abilities. 
Litjens (2017) argues that younger managers 
(CEOs) tend to have excessive self-confidence due 
to higher knowledge and abilities in problem 
solving. Excessive self-confidence makes them 
bolder in taking risks. The argument is supported 
by Serfling (2014) who found that CEO age is 
associated with lower risk. Peltomäki et al., (2018) 
also reported consistent findings that CEO age is 
negatively related to stock volatility.  
Younger managers have more incentives to 
withhold bad news to avoid adverse effect on 
compensation and labor market (Andreou et al., 
2017). This is due to the fact that younger 
managers have longer future career and desire to 
proof their abilities to build good reputation in 
labor market. Disclosure of negative information 
should have more negative impact on personal 
wealth of younger mangers because labor market 
will use this information as a basis for determining 
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compensation in the future. However, bad news 
accumulation cannot be hidden in the long run and 
ultimately must be revealed to the market. Thus, 
firms managed by younger managers are more 
likely to experience stock price crashes.  
H3: Firms managed by younger managers 
experience higher stock price crashes      than 
older managers 
As described earlier, the relationship between 
default risk and stock price crashes can be positive 
or negative depending on the ability of investors to 
obtain private information. But the findings in 
Andreou et al., (2017) suggests that the correlation 
between the two variables might be influenced by 
the characteristics of managers who manage the 
company. Younger managers have more courage 
to choose accounting policies to hide default risk. 
The courage is driven by a very strong desire to 
build a reputation as a young manager with 
extraordinary achievements. On the contrary, 
older managers do not have the same desire to 
prove their achievements. They prefer natural 
ways to resolve financial problems and are not 
compelled to cover default risk.  
However, the effect of manager age on the 
relationship between default risk and price crashes 
depends on the assumptions of private information 
ownership. If investors are assumed to be unable 
to anticipate the firm's financial difficulties, a 
positive relationship between default risk and 
price crashes will be stronger in firms managed by 
younger managers relative to older managers. 
Conversely, if investors are assumed to be able to 
anticipate the firm's financial difficulties, a 
negative relationship between default risk and 
price crashes will be stronger in companies 
managed by younger managers compared to older 
managers. Thus, moderating effect of age on the 
the relationship between default risk and price 
crashes cannot be stated in  a specific direction.  
H4: Age of managers afect the relationship 
between default risk and stock price crashes 
As previously described, there are two 
opposing views related to income smoothing. The 
first view is built upon the argument of 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. It is argued 
that managers have incentives to hide bad news to 
present stable earnings growth over time. 
However, efforts to smooth income by choosing 
certain accounting policies cannot be sustained in 
the long run. At the end, there are no ways left to 
maintain smooth earnings and firms are forced to 
disclose accumulated bad news at once. The 
market would reacts strongly following the 
revelation. Thus, a managerial opportunistic 
behaviour may result in large drop in stock price.  
The situation is worse when younger 
managers control the company.  With higher high 
self-confidence, it is expected that younger 
managers are bolder to do extreme income 
smoothing, making positive effect of income 
smoothing on stock price crashes stonger. It 
should be noted that this condition occurs when 
investors are not aware of income smoothing in 
prior years.  
The second is built upon the assumption that 
managers are highly responsible on well-being of 
firms. With that characteristic, managers seek to 
eliminate information asymmetry regarding the 
real condition of the company to investors. If 
investors do not fully understand the prospect of 
the firm, firms are expected to engage in income 
smoothing to provide signals about a firm’s real 
condition. In this perspective, income smoothing 
is an effort to prevent stock price departed from 
intrinsic value. Younger managers are expected to 
provide aggresive signaling in an attempt to show 
his managerial qualities. Thus, a negative effect of 
income smoothing on stock price crashes is 
expected to be stronger for firms managed by 
younger managers. 
H5: Age of managers affect the relationship 
between income smoothing and stock price 
crashes 
 
3. Research method 
This study collects sample from Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2013-2017. This specific 
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period was chosen because many public 
companies experienced a decline in stock prices as 
reflected in higher market index volatility (Butar, 
2019). Data sources are mainly collected from 
IDX website and firm’ official website. The 
sampling criteria are as follows:  
1) Firms are listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2013 to 2017, except 
financial and insurance companies. 
Financial and insurance industries are 
excluded because these companies have 
different financial characteristics. 
2) Financial statements are available in rupiah 
and fiscal year of 31 December.   
3) Annual reports are available from the 
sources and provide complete information to 
measure variables.   
Based on the sample selection criteria 
presented in table 1, the number of firms available 
for test of hypotheses is 910 (182 x 5 years). 
 
Table 1. Sampling criteria 
Criteria Total 
Firms are listed on the JCI in 2017 572 
Firm are not listed for five consecutive years from 2013-2017 (22) 
Firms belong to insurance, securities and banking industries (99) 
Financial data were stated in US Dollar (25) 
Annual report are not available from data sources  (89) 
Annual report does not contain financial statements  (35) 
Stock prices are not available from data sources (58) 
Board of directors' profile are not available in annual reports (62) 
Final sample 182 
Stock price crashes  
Stock price crash is defined as a sudden drop 
of stock prices in a relatively short period (Hutton 
et al., 2009; Zhu, 2016). Consistent with prior 
studies, this study employs an expanded market 
model by adding t-2 and t-1 lags and leads t+2 and 
t+1 into the standard market model (Andreou et 
al., 2016; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011). 
The expanded market model is stated as follows: 
 
Rjt = αj + β1Rm,t-2 + β2 Rm,t-1 + β3 Rm,t + β4 Rm,t+1 + β5 Rm,t+2 + εj,t   (1) 
Note: Rj is individual return of firm j in week t; RM is market return in week t. 
The residuals from the expanded market 
model (εj, t) are added by 1 and then transformed 
into natural logarithms to wj, t = ln (1 + ej, t). The 
conversion is applied to reduce the tendency of 
asymmetrical return distributions (Andreou et al., 
2016; Kim et al., 2011). Transformed residual (wj, 
t) is used as a measure of the stock price crashes.  
The residuals reflect firm-specific information. 
 
Income smoothing  
Measure of income smoothing follows                        
a procedure developed in (Gassen & Fülbier, 
2015). Income smoothing is a ratio of standard 
deviation of net income and standard deviation of 
operating cash flows deflated with total assets. 
 
Default risk  
Measure of default risk follows  Altman Z 
score that has been specifically developed for 
firms in developing countries (Altman, 2005). The 
formula is stated as follows:  
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Def_Risk= 6.56*X1 + 3.26*X2 + 6.72* X3 + 1.05* X4     (2) 
 
Note: X1 is working capital divided by total assets; X2 is retained earnings divided by total assets; X3 is EBIT divided by t otal 
assets; X4 is shareholder equity divided by total assets.  
 
Manager age 
Manager age is an indicator variable, equal 1 
if a manager’s age below 51 and 0 otherwise. The 
measure is adopted from Andreou et al., (2017) 
who find significant difference in stock price 
crashes between the two groups. The term 
manager in this study is referred to president 
directors or directors.   
 
The control variables  
Prior studies report that size, profitability, 
leverage and sales growth have significant effects 
on price crashes (Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 
2009; Jin & Myers, 2006). For this reason, these 
variables are included in the regression model as 
control variables. These four control variables are 
measured as follows: 1) Size is Ln total assets. 2) 
Profitability is the ratio of net income to total 
assets. 3) Sales growth is the difference between 
current and last year's sales divided by current 
year's sales. 4) debt level is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets.      
The test of hypotheses is conducted using the 
following regression model: 
 
Crashesjt = β0 + β1Smoothjt+ β2Defaultjt + β3Agejt + β4Age*Smoothjt + β5Age*Defaultjt + β6Sizejt + 
β7Growthjt+ β8ROAjt + β9LEVjt + εjt   (3) 
Where,   
- Crashes = Stock price crashes. 
- Smooth = Income smoothing.  
- Default = Default risk. 
- Age = Age of managers, equal 1 if manager age below median and 0 otherwise.  
- Age*Smooth = Interaction of age and income smoothing. 
- Age*Default  = Interaction of age and default risk.   
- Size =  Firm size. 
- Growth =  Sales growth. 
- ROA =  Profitability. 
- LEV =  Leverage 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Based on the sample selection critera, as much 
as 910 firm samples are available for the test of 
hypotheses. Of these, 58 firm samples were 
excluded to satisfy data normality assumption, 
leaving 852 available for further examination. 
Descriptive statistics for each variable are 
presented in table 2. As shown in Table 2, the mean 
for stock price crashes (crashes) is 2.49, indicating 
the worst weekly return is 2.49 times the standard 
deviation below the mean.  
Meanwhile, mean for income smoothing 
(Smooth) is 0.004, suggesting that level of income 
smoothing is moderate. Mean for the default risk is 
5.47. Note that this figure is obtained from the 
Altman Z Score formula. Manager age has an 
average of 0.35, suggesting that proportion of 
managers who aged 51 years and younger is lower 
than those aged above 51 years.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Dev. 
Crashes 852 0.002 5.43 2.49 0.89 
Smooth 852 0.00 0.78 0.004 0.03 
Default 852 -8.64 10.99 5.40 2.27 
Age 852 0.00 1 0.35 0.47 
Age*Smooth 852 0.00 0.21 0.002 0.01 
Age*Default 852 -2.76 10.99 1.89 2.94 
Size 852 2.83 12.60 7.83 1.75 
Growth 852 -1.00 3.50 0.08 0.39 
ROA 852 -1.51 1.01 0.03 0.14 
Lev 852 0.01 3.24 0.49 0.31 
   Source: SPSS output, 2019
Mean for interaction of age and default risk 
(Age*Default) and income smoothing 
(Age*Smooth) are 0.0002 and 1.89, respectively. 
Because both variables are interaction variables, 
these figures have no meaning. The Mean for firm 
size (Size) is 7.83, suggesting that firm samples are 
generally medium-sized firms. Meanwhile, the 
mean for firm’s growth (Growth) and profitability 
(ROA) are 0.08 and 0.03 respectively, indicating 
moderate growth and low profitability. The mean 
for debt (Lev) of 0.49 indicates that on everage 
sample firms do not have financial difficulties. 
Correlation coefficient 
Table 3 presents coefficient correlations of 
main variables The main focus is on the 
relationship between stock price crashes as 
dependent variable and the hypothesized 
independent variables stated in the research 
hypothesis. Income smoothing and stock price 
crashes (Crashes) are positively correlated (0.013) 
but statistically insignificant (two-tail). The 
correlation between default risk and stock price 
crashes is negative (-0.022) but statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficient 
 Crashes Smooth Default Age Age*Smooth Age*Default 
Crashes  1 0.013 -0.022 -0.087* -0.021 -0.055 
Smooth  0.013 1 0.075* 0.036 0.456** 0.036 
Default  -0.022 0.075* 1 0.005 0.013 0.297** 
Age  -0.087* 0.036 0.005 1 0.182** 0.880** 
Age*Smooth  -0.021 0.456** 0.013 0.182** 1 0.170** 
Age*Default  -0.055 0.036 0.297** 0.880** 0.170** 1 
 * Correlation is significant at 0.05 (two tails) 
 ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 (two tails). 
Source: SPSS output, 2019. 
The correlation between manager age and stock 
price crashes is negative (-0.087) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (two tails). However, the 
direction is not consistent with prediction. 
Meanwhile, the correlation between the two 
interacting variables and stock price crashes is also 
insignificant with p-value of -0.021 and 0.107 
respectively. Taking as a whole, the results 
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presented in table 3 provide preliminary evidence 
to reject moderating effect of age on stock price 
crashes. 
 
Results of the hypothesis tests 
Table 4 presents the test of hypotheses. 
Adjusted R2 is relatively small (2.6%). It suggests a 
low ability of independent variables to explain 
variations in stock price crashes. In other word, 
most variations in stock price crashes are 
influenced by other variables outside the model. 
Simultaneously, the effect of income smoothing, 
default risk, and moderating effect of age on stock 
price crashes are relatively strong as reflected in p-
value less than 1% or F-test of 3.554.  
The H1 predicts that income smoothing affect 
stock price crashes, but the test result do not 
supported H1.  Meanwhile, the H2 that predicts 
default risk affects stock price crashes is 
statistically supported as the p-value less than 1%. 
This finding suggests that the higher the default 
risk, the lower the risk of stock price crashes.  
Moreover, the H3 that predicts firms managed 
by younger managers have a higher risk of stock 
price crashes than the older ones. The manager age 
is measured by a dummy variable (1 for manager 
age is under 51 and 0 for manager age is above 51). 
The results shows that manager age (Age) is 
negatively associated with crashes at less than 1% 
level of significance. This means that companies 
managed by older managers are more at risk of 
experiencing stock price crashes than younger 
managers. Thus, H3 is rejected. 
Furthermore, the H4 predicts that age of 
managers affect the relationship between default 
risk and stock price crashes. The regression 
analysis showed that the interaction coefficient of 
age and default risk (Age*Default) is positive and 
significant at less than 5% significant level. Thus, 
the test result confirm H4.  
 Lastly, the H5 predicts that age of managers 
effect the relationship between income smoothing 
and stock price crash and the result showed that 
interaction of age and income smoothing 
(Age*Smooth) is statistically insignificant. Thus, 
the test results reject the H5. 
 
Table 4. The data analysis results 
Variables Coefficients Dev. Std T P-Value 
Constant 3.625 0.228 15.901 0.000 
Smooth 0.401 1.153 0.347 0.728 
Default -0.069 0.021 -3.309 0.001 
Age  -0.519 0.162 -3.211 0.001 
Age*Smooth -3.461 2.511 -1.378 0.168 
Age*Default 0.066 0.027 2.414 0.016 
Size  -0.071 0.018 -3.845 0.000 
Growth  -0.054 0.078 -0.695 0.487 
ROA 0.196 0.249 0.788 0.431 
Lev -0.292 0.121 -2.413 0.016 
Adjusted R2  0.026    
F-Stat 3.554    
P-Value 0.000    
  Source: SPSS output, 2019 
Discussions 
The results of the regression analysis do not 
support H1 that states income smoothing affect 
stock price crashes. It seems that investors do not 
respond to managers' efforts to present stable 
earnings trends over time. This implies that the 
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income smoothing undertaken by managers do not 
affect investors' views about the firm's prospects. 
Although managers try to display a positive image 
of the firm's financial performance, it seems that 
investors can see what really happens behind the 
stable earnings trend. Stock price movements are 
not affected by managers' efforts to influence 
market perception.  
This finding is not consistent with Chen et al., 
(2017) who found evidence that a high level of 
income smoothing increases the risk of stock price 
crashes. But additional test showed that income 
smoothing was associated with negative returns. 
The market seem to be able to quickly anticipates 
income smoothing. In light of Chen et al., (2017) 
findings, the failure to identify the relationship 
between income smoothing and stock price crashes 
in this study may be an indicative of investors 
abilites to anticipate income smoothing before 
stock price crashes occurred.     
Furthermore, the relationship between default 
risk and stock price crashes stated in H2 depends on 
the assumptions about the ownership of private 
information by investors. The first assumption is 
the market does not know about the default risk that 
firms had hidden for long time. As previously 
described, firms under financial distress are more 
likely to experience defaults in meeting financial 
obligations. The higher the financial problems, the 
greater the possibility of stock price crashes.  
Firms seek to find ways to prevent investors 
from understanding firm's financial condition to 
avoid the downside of stock prices that may trigger 
stock price crashes. However, the efforts to hide 
bad news cause bad news accumulation to pile up. 
Ultimately, firms are forced to reveal the 
accumulated bad news at once, leading to stock 
price crashes. Thus, default risk is predicted to be 
positively related to stock price crashes.  
The second assumption is that investors are 
able to detect and anticipate financial difficulties 
and gradually adjust firm’s stock prices. Gradual 
adjustments prevent incidence of stock price 
crashes. In light of efficient market theory, the 
finding reported in this study is consistent with 
efficient market theory. However, it should be 
noted that prior studies show that the market cannot 
fully anticipate the effects of firm’s financial 
difficulties (Lamon et al., 2001; White & Wu, 
2006). With no sufficient information from within 
the company, the market will not be able to detect 
hidden bad news.    
The results of this study demonstrated that the 
default risk negatively affects stock price crashes. 
The negative relationship supports the second 
assumption that market participants are able to 
detect firm’s financial difficulties and anticipate 
them before things get worse. They do this by 
releasing their stock ownership gradually and thus 
prevent stock price crashes. In sum, the higher the 
default risk, the lower the risk of stock price 
crashes.   
Firms managed by younger managers are more 
likely to experience stock price crashes as stated in 
H3. Younger managers have excessive self-
confidence and motivation to show their abilities 
and competences to impress labor market. They are 
risk takers and more willing to engage in income 
smoothing for the purpose of reputation. Practice of 
income smoothing through selecting accounting 
policy allow them to hide bad news so that firm 
performances look stable over time. However, the 
accumulation of bad news cannot be hidden at all 
times and must be disclosed to the market. On the 
other hand, older managers do not have the same 
desires and urge to pursue outstanding career. They 
are not compelled to adopt unsound reporting 
practices to hide bad performance. Thus, firms 
managed by older managers are less likely to 
experience stock price crashes.   
Test of hypothesis shows that age has a 
positive effect on stock price crashes. However, the 
observed sign is contrary to the prediction. A 
positive direction suggests that firms managed by 
older managers are more likely to experience stock 
price crashes. This finding is not consistent with 
Andreou et al., (2017) who used US firms as 
samples. The contradicting result may be attributed 
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to  differences in personal characters of Indonesian 
managers and US managers. While younger 
managers in US seem to be more open to the 
practice of bad news hoarding, younger managers 
in Indonesia prefer normal ways to advance their 
careers. They realize that their career are still long 
to go and do not want to sacrifice them for short-
term results. When experiencing financial 
performance declines, younger managers in 
Indonesia chose to acknowledge and disclose bad 
news when it occurs so that the accumulation of bad 
news that lead to stock price crashes can be 
prevented.       
The results also demonstrated that interaction 
between age and default risk has positive effect on 
stock price crashes at 5% level of significance. This 
findings is contrary to H2 test result that default risk 
has a negative effect on stock price crashes and also 
contrary to H3 test result that age has a negative 
effect on stock price crashes. As explained earlier, 
the negative sign is an indicative of investor’s 
ability to detect and anticipate financial difficulties 
by gradually sell their shares and thus preventing 
stock price crashes. Furthermore, it suggests that 
firms managed by older managers are more likely 
to experience stock price crashes. When age 
interacts with default risk and price crashes, the 
sign of coefficient becomes positive, which means 
that firms with higher default risk and managed by 
younger managers are more likely to experience 
stock price crashes.  
A change from negative to positive sign is 
quite confusing and no explanation could be offered 
right now to explain this bizarre behaviour. 
Subsequent studies by using different default risk 
measures should be conducted before strong 
inferences be made. It is possible that the Altman Z 
Score measure of default risk is not appropriate in 
Indonesia context resulting in contradicting results. 
Another possibility is that the measure of age based 
on two grouping, below and above 51, are not strict 
enough to separate older and younger managers 
groupings.       
As described earlier, H5 is stated without no 
specific direction due to conflicting arguments 
linking income smoothing and stock price crashes. 
However, the test result show the insignificant 
effect of income smoothing on stock price crashes. 
We have to look at the initial relationship between 
income smoothing and stock price crashes to 
understand the insignificant result. The direction of 
the interaction coefficient depends on the initial 
relationship between income smoothing and stock 
price crashes. The following paragraphs describe 
the possibilities of the moderating effect of age on 
the relationship between income smoothing and 
stock price crashes. These are reflected in the signs 
of interacting variables. 
First, the interacting coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. This condition occurs 
because income smoothing and stock price crashes 
have a positive relationship. A positive relationship 
between income smoothing and stock price crashes 
is expected to be magnified when a company is 
managed by younger managers. In this scenario, the 
interaction coefficient is predicted to have a 
positive direction. In spite of managing by older 
managers, the direction is predicted to be positive. 
However, the magnitude of direction is lower for 
firms managed by older managers than those 
managed by younger managers. Note that in both 
conditions, opportunistic behaviour is assumed to 
persist but stronger for younger managers.       
Second, the interacting coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. This condition occurs 
because income smoothing and stock price crashes 
are negatively related. As explained in the previous 
section, the negative relationship between income 
smoothing and stock price crashes is based on the 
assumption that the manager is a responsible person 
and cares about firm's prospects. If income 
smoothing and stock price crashes are negatively 
related then two possibilities exist regarding the 
sign of interacting variable: 1) when a company is 
managed by younger managers with obsessions to 
show best performance, the negative correlation 
between income smoothing and stock price crashes 
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is expected to be stronger. Thus, the interacting 
coefficient is also predicted to be positive. 2) when 
a company is managed by older managers, the 
correlation between income smoothing and stock 
price crashes is expected to remain positive but the 
magnitude the interacting coefficient is expected to 
be lower than firms managed by younger managers.    
Third, the interacting coefficient is positive 
(negative) but is not statistically significant. In this 
condition, two possibilities exist regarding the sign 
of interacting variable: 1) the initial relationship 
between income smoothing and stock price crashes 
is positive (negative) but not statistically significant 
and the relationship between age and stock price 
crashes is positive (negative) but also not 
statistically significant. 2) the initial relationship 
between income smoothing and stock price crashes 
may be positive (negative) but statistically 
insignificant but the correlation between age and 
stock price crashes are positive (negative) and 
statistically significant.  
Comparing one possibility to others, it can be 
concluded that the third possibility is consistent 
with the test result. The interacting coefficient is 
negative but statistically insignificant. In addition, 
the test results also show that age has a negative 
effect on stock price crashes, but income smoothing 
has no significant effect on stock price crashes. 
Taken together, the results indicate that, although 
insignificant, the negative interacting coefficient is 
due to negative effect of age on stock price crashes. 
However, when age of manager is interacted with 
income smoothing, the effect on stock price crashes 
is significantly reduced that it does not affect stock 
price movements. This finding suggests that age 
plays an important role in influencing stock price 
crashes, but the effect is not strong enough to 
change the relationship between income smoothing 
and stock price crashes.           
It has been explained previously that there are 
two conflicting views related to income smoothing. 
The first is built upon opportunistic nature of 
managers. It is argued that managers have 
incentives to hide bad news through selecting 
certain accounting policies to report stable earnings 
from time to time. However, efforts to smooth 
income by choosing certain accounting policies 
cannot be carried out for ever. Ultimately there are 
no ways left to maintain smoothing earnings and 
accumulated bad news have to be revealed at once, 
leading to stock price crashes. The situation is 
worse for firms managed by younger managers due 
to extreme income smoothing practices.  
Younger managers are expected to have a 
greater incentive to engage in income smoothing 
than older managers. A strong impetus is triggered 
by a desire to establish outstanding reputation as a 
young, high-achieving manager. The courage of 
young managers to engage in income smoothing 
relative to older managers strengthen the positive 
effect of income smoothing on stock price crashes. 
As a result, the decline in stock prices occurs with 
a greater intensity that it triggers a severe stock 
price crashes as well. It should be noted that this 
condition can only occur with the assumption that 
investors do not know the income smoothing 
practices in the past.  
The second view to support income smoothing 
is built upon the assumption that managers are 
individuals who are responsible and concerned 
about firm's sustainability. Managers are assumed 
to be mindful of increasing shareholders’s welfare 
and reducing asymmetric information with regard 
to firm's prospects. A manager who has a strong 
belief in firm's prospects may use certain 
accounting policies to smooth earnings so that the 
market’s perception matches manager’s. In this 
perspective, income smoothing engagement is an 
effort to prevent stock price crashes. If the company 
is managed by younger managers, the negative 
effect of income smoothing on stock price crashes 
is expected to be stronger than older managers and 
vice versa. This is due to strong desire within 
younger managers to give signals to investors . 
Test result of H5 does not appear to support the 
predictions. The insignificant result may be induced 
by the initial relationship between income 
smoothing and stock price crashes as stated in H1. 
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As reported before, H1 is not statistically 
supported. Although as a main variabel, age has 
negative effect on stock price crashes but 
interaction with income smoothing causes the 
effect of age to be no longer dominant in 
influencing stock price crashes. Therefore, the 
insignificant interacting variable implies that 
investors do not regard age of managers as an 
essential factor in assessing the effect of income 
smoothing on the firm's stock price. Regardless of 
how old are the managers who run the companies, 
the market seems to understand and be able to 
assess the effect of income smoothing on firm's 
prospects. With regard to control variables, firm 
size (Size) and leverage (Lev) are the only variables 
that affect price crashes with 1% and 5% level of 
significant respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study study seeks to identify factors that 
influence stock price crashes in the context of the 
Indonesian capital market. The finding suggests 
that investors are quite rational in assessing the 
economic reality of a company. Efforts to smooth 
income through selecting certain accounting 
policies seem to have no effect on investors' 
perceptions of future performances. Secondly, the 
default risk is inversely related to stock price 
crashes. It seems that investors are able to detect 
firms’ financial difficulties and make a quick 
respond to anticipate large drop in stock prices.  
Thirdly, firms managed by older managers 
pose higher stock price crash risk relative to those 
managed by younger managers. However, the 
findings are not consistent with the prediction. 
Differences in manager’s characters may explain 
the insignificant result. Younger Indonesian 
managers seem not to be as aggressive as younger 
managers in other countries, for example in the US.  
Fourthly, the interaction of age and default risk 
has positive effect on stock price crashes. The result 
suggests that firms having higher default risk and 
managed by younger managers are more likely to 
experience stock price crashes. Lastly, the 
interaction between age and income smoothing has 
no effect on stock price crashes. This findings 
suggests that investors are rational enough in 
assessing the purpose of income smoothing that age 
of managers does not influence their views on 
firm’s prospects. The market seems to be able to 
assess the economic effects of income smoothing 
regardless of a manager’s age.       
Generalization of the results should be made 
carefully. This study uses weekly returns to 
measure stock price crashes. Further researches 
should consider to use different proxies for stock 
price crashes and income smoothing, for example 
changes in earnings before earnings management 
and abnormal accrual changes. 
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